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Abstracts of Chapters 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The introductory chapter takes note of the recent revival of Bergson’s philosophy after a period of relative 
decline as a result of criticisms, often unfair, coming from influential philosophical schools of the last 
century. It gives the intention of the book, which is to contribute to Bergson’s revival by providing a 
perspective that gives an insight into the originality and strength of his work. This perspective rests on the 
central idea that an interpretation that is both renovating and able to counter the criticisms is reached if 
we grasp duration as the key to an understanding of being as self-overcoming. The provided perspective 
does not adhere to the order of invention by following the sequence of publication of Bergson’s books. 
Rather, it demonstrates the centrality of the notion of self-overcoming by using the method of logical 
derivation. It thus shows that all Bergson’s basic concepts, such as intuitive knowledge, creation, the 
virtual and the actual, the vital élan, the closed and the open society, are all instances of self-overcoming, 
and that the famous Bergsonian oppositions (quantity/quality, space/time, matter/memory, 
freedom/determinism, etc.) are not contradictory because they are analytic, objectified views on the 
indivisible dynamics governing the overstepping of limitations. The proposed new reading gives an idea 
of its prospects by providing a detailed summary of the contents of each chapter.  
 
Chapter 2: Intuitive Knowledge via the Inversion of Intelligence 
 
Action and Intuition 
Bergsonism and Theories of Knowledge 
Epistemological Divergence 
Intuitive Knowledge as Ideal Genesis 
Inversion and False Problems 
Crossing Limitations 
 
Chapter 2 elucidates Bergson’s notion of intuitive knowledge, the reason for dealing with this issue first 
being that none of the Bergsonian concepts achieves clarity unless one keeps in mind the existence of two 
modes of knowledge. Notably, the Kantian idea of putting time and space at the same level as forms of 
representation requires, when it is correctly understood, the distinction between spatialized, 
representational time and generative or creative time. While representation and intelligence juxtapose 
things in space and moments in spatialized time for the good of practical and social life, in gathering the 
spatially distinct moments and things, intuitive knowledge thinks in duration and, in so doing, grasps them 
from inside. In other words, it enacts or performs instead of taking external views on things. The 
relationship between intelligence and intuition is thus not one of opposition but of complementarity, since 
the role of intuition is to reintegrate what the analytic ability of intelligence separates and externally 
connects. Clearly, this effort of reintegration of what is dissociated is how intuition incorporates and 
overcomes the work of intelligence. 
Chapter 3: Duration and Self-Striving 
 
In Search of True Time 
Towards a Dynamic Conception of Time 
Continuity versus Discontinuity 
Duration and Consciousness 
Duration as the Stuff of Reality 
Duration as Effort 
Beyond Free Will and Determinism 
 
Chapter 3 undertakes a thorough study of duration by contrasting the notion with representative 
conceptions of time. It shows that when philosophers admit the reality of time, they either reduce 
becoming to an appearance or to an unfolding of what is already given, as in the case of dialectics. Since 
time, so conceived, does or produces nothing, the need to provide a specific function favored the 
subjectification of time. While the reduction of time to representation conveniently agrees with the needs 
of practical life, it posits duration as what time must be to be real and hence productive. Time becomes 
generative if its moments, instead of dissociating and displaying, fuses into an indistinct and 
heterogeneous unity. For a unity to be both indistinct and multiple, it must be actualized as consciousness, 
that is, as a content existing in the mode of self-consciousness. In this way, going beyond phenomenology, 
Bergson accounts for both the intentionality of consciousness and its ontological dimension. In its practical 
function, consciousness is intentionality; as duration, it is being made. With this result, the chapter moves 
toward the idea of duration as substance: the prolongation of attributes and states into one another 
excludes the recourse to a fixed support, just as it overcomes dualism, since the distinction between 
consciousness and matter moves from being substantial to a difference in intensity. Differentiations based 
on consideration of tension and relaxation associate the intensification of duration with the gestation of 
effort. With effort, we have what is needed to overcome the debate between the defenders of free will 
and determinists. Both positions are just different retrospective reconstructions based on the belief that 
the action in question is already given. For the proponents of free will, freedom is about choosing between 
given alternative courses; for determinists, the choice is illusory because the die is already cast. In thus 
refusing to pay attention to the fact that decision takes time, both theories decline the path leading to a 
solution, namely, the effort of concentration yielding a creative outcome, as opposed to choosing 
between preexisting courses of action or unfolding a predetermined course .  
Chapter 4: Life as the Inversion of Materiality 
Being and Nothingness 
The Negativity of Action 
Controversy over Negativity 
Negation without Nothingness 
The Striving of Self-Limitation 
Unity versus Analysis 
Transcending Finalism and Mechanism 
The Oneness of Life 
Enduring Striving in lieu of the Eternal 
 
Chapter 4 deepens the durational unity and distinction between consciousness and materiality, as 
encapsulated in the concept of “vital élan.” Since Bergson’s attempt is to go beyond dualism by conceiving 
consciousness, life, and materiality as different levels of durational tension, the prime condition for this 
stratifying approach is to provide an ontology that is free of negativity. In particular, the dualistic 
opposition between matter and consciousness must be set aside and replaced by a conception allowing 
the transition from the one to the other. The removal of opposition invalidates the reductionism on which 
monistic schools of idealism and materialism are based. To this effect, the chapter reviews Bergson’s 
arguments against nothingness and his restriction of negative concepts to practical significance, thereby 
laying the ground for an integrative ontology. This is where the question of Bergson’s consistency is raised. 
As many critics noted, his understanding of matter as a movement inverse of life introduces negativity 
into the center of his ontology. While admitting that Bergson describes the connection between matter 
and life in terms of opposition, I argue that one must differentiate the level of analysis from the intuitive 
grasp whose defined feature is precisely the overcoming of oppositions. In fusing life and matter, intuition 
obtains the vision of an élan, of an inversion recuperating as a striving to surpass itself, to obtain more 
from itself than its original endowment. Living beings are various outcomes of this striving, otherwise 
called evolution, which then is essentially creative because the necessity of materiality can be 
circumvented only through invention. In addition to dismissing both finalism and mechanism, the creative 
conception of evolution clearly demarcates Bergsonism from dialectical thinking. On the one hand, the 
striving nature of life means that the élan is finite, trapped as it is in its own inversion as necessity, on the 
other hand, as a self-overcoming phenomenon, it has no terminus. 
 
Chapter 5: Perception and the Genesis of the Subject 
 
The Contradictions of Representational Theories of Perception 
From the Material to the Psychic 
Perception: Pure and Concrete 
Materiality and the Notion of Image 
Bergson and Phenomenology: The Issue of the Subject 
The Mechanism of Perception 
Limitation and Perception 
 
Chapter 5 addresses the question of perception with the view of understanding the genesis of the subject 
through the display of a world reflecting its possible actions. It begins by exposing the source of the 
contradictions of classical theories, namely, the conception of perception as a projection of the mental 
duplicates formed from the reactions of the brain to the influences of external objects. To this assumption 
shared by realists and materialists, idealism responds that the reference to an externally existing world 
has no foundation given that the perceiver has access only to what is in the mind. The only way to break 
the deadlock is to advance the bold thesis that things are perceived neither in the brain nor in the mind; 
instead, they are perceived where they are because they are made perceivable. Since the necessity of 
matter is the reason for the non-perceivability of things, a mechanism able to select what is of interest to 
the living body while also retarding the actions and reactions connecting the perceiver with the selected 
portion would made them perceivable. In other words, the brain is not an organ of representation, but a 
delaying and selecting mechanism that inserts indetermination into the material environment and, in so 
doing, converts necessity into possible actions. To say that things are perceived where they are is to imply 
that they are perceived as they are. However, we do not perceive them as they are, that is, as fleeting and 
numberless vibrations, as science describes them. Hence Bergson’s distinction between pure perception 
and concrete perception: through the condensing act of memory, the fleeting vision of pure perception is 
changed into the concrete perception of stable and colorful objects. The affirmation that things are 
perceived where they are seems to suggest a convergence between phenomenology and Bergsonism. In 
assessing the convergence, the chapter highlights their crucial difference. Though both reject the theory 
of perception as a projection of mental states, with phenomenology, consciousness reveals things thanks 
to its intentionality, while to Bergson, things themselves are revealed to the subject, precisely by 
appearing as images. Pure perception is the lowest or impersonal level of consciousness; concrete 
perception is the level of the subject born out of the durational continuity of memory. In this way, the 
fleeting present of the living body is overcome by the being-made or the self. 
 
Chapter 6: Memory and the Being of the Subject 
 
Memory and Action 
On the Conservation and Nature of Memory 
Deleuze and Bergson 
Intentionality and the Continuity of Consciousness 
The Actualization of Memory 
On the Unity of Mind and Body  
 
Chapter 6 first develops memory’s role in practical life and then tackles the issue of the union of mind and 
body. Unlike the appearing and disappearing present of materiality, the present of consciousness has 
some thickness because memory prolongs the past into the present. This integration of moments 
generates a perpetual tension actualizing consciousness, as opposed to the nonconsciousness of 
materiality caused by its evanescent present. The prolongation is also how action benefits from past 
experience instead of being an automatic response to external influences. Experience becomes useful if 
the relevant information is selected from the past: hence the positive role of forgetting. The latter 
operates like a blockage keeping unconscious the irrelevant part, thereby focusing consciousness on 
practical life. To speak of what is no more in terms of non-consciousness is to reject the theory of memory 
as a weak perception in favor of theory advocating the active creation of memory-images. The rejection 
entails the distinction between pure memory and memory-images, with the consequence that pure 
memory is not a storage, but an indivisible and indistinct continuity, in short, the thinking and concrete 
self. To develop this point further, the chapter confronts Deleuze’s interpretation of Bergson’s view in the 
direction of “world-memory” and shows that confining consciousness to the psychological level, in 
distinction to the ontological status of memory, does not agree with the Bergsonian identification of 
consciousness with memory. This identification is also used to contest interpretations proposing a 
rapprochement between Bergson and phenomenology. Though some similarities are undeniable, the 
huge difference is that the Bergsonian retention is just not intentionality in that it is also an ontological 
act, the continuity of the being-made. Given that memory is an imageless continuity, the question of its 
actualization as memory-images ushers in the study of the sensori-motor function of the living body. 
Memory uses the sensations associated with the nascent actions of motor memory to assume the 
appearance of images and inserts into the present of the living body. This image appearance effects the 
union of mind and body, which is, therefore, nothing more than synchronization. In proposing an 
alternative to parallelism as well as to the assumption of a causal relation, as envisaged by dualism or 
materialism, Bergsonism reduces the issue of mind-body relation to the process by which the mind limits 
itself so as to be attentive to the life of the body. Nothing could illustrate better the concept of self-
overcoming than the mind overflowing the body and limiting itself to upgrade practical life. 
 
Chapter 7: Mysticism or the Overstepping of Nature 
 
Halt versus Stage 
Duality of Source and Self-Overcoming 
Moral Obligation and Social Conservativism 
The Natural Society 
Opening the Natural 
Overdetermination and Progress 
Problems of Modernity 
 
Chapter 7 extends the concept of self-overcoming to moral and social issues and to the question of social 
progress, as examined in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. The book places the theme of self-
overcoming at the center of moral and social issues by conceiving social life as a stoppage carrying the 
injunction to overcome it so as to continue the unfinished creative work of life. In this case, overcoming 
means the effort to unbind the restrictions and the hierarchical organization that form the basis of the 
closed society. As a continuation of the biological work, the closed society is natural to human beings and 
is the source of obligations in a setting structured around the distinction between command and 
obedience. In addition, the sense of belonging is strengthened by a natural hostility to other groups and 
the fear of supernatural powers protective of the social order. This conception of social order as a 
stoppage posits another source of morality and religion calling for the continuation of the movement in 
the direction of human fraternity and spearheaded by the mystic love of humanity. Because the one 
source wants to open what the other source has closed, the temptation is great for a dialectical reading 
of this duality of source. However, a crucial factor is missing owing to Bergson’s rejection of a goal-driven 
historical process: unlike the notion of stage, stoppage requires a creative deviation, not a linear process. 
Consequently, the relationship between the two sources does not translate into the closed progressively 
realizing the ideal or mixing with it. Rather, the mystical, while remaining distinct, inspires the creative 
effort to translate love, which by nature is limitless and hence beyond legality and obligation, in terms of 
rights and duties. The inspirational relation between the ideal and the real, as opposed to the real 
progressively realizing the ideal, is due to the fact that the closed society is a natural structure that cannot 
be removed. This fact advises a cautious usage of the term “progress.” Not only do the realized 
advancements remain fragile, but also disharmony conditions progress because the tendencies of social 
life cannot develop at the same time. The need for a successive development of the tendencies explains 
social conflicts and imbalances, in particular those affecting modernity. Without rejecting the effort to 
correct the problems by reforms, Bergson argues that the reliable solution to counter the excesses of 
modern life, notably the frenzied pursuit of material wealth, comfort, and pleasure, is the commitment to 
simple life subsequent to a spiritual renovation inspired by the mystic love of God and humanity. This 
radical solution is none other than a call for the overcoming of the human, a call that is all the more 
pressing as our natural characteristics are ill-equipped to handle the destructive powers that science and 
technology have put at our disposal. 
 
8. Conclusion  
The concluding chapter gives a succinct view of the results obtained by the proposed interpretation. It 
concludes by showing that Bergson’s refusal to endow negative concepts with ontological meanings 
inaugurates a joyful vison celebrating the triumphant march of life’s victory over itself, whose end-goal is 
none other than the attainment of worthiness to God’s love.   
 
 
